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1. Introduction 
On landing at the airport at Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh in early March 2018, I made my 
way down the steps from the plane and noticed a small group of well-dressed men 
standing not far away. They were unfurling a large banner that said ‘Humanitarian 
Relief to Rohinga (sic) Refugees’, sponsored by Charity for Life, Sydney, supported 
by the Tangail and Cox’s Bazar Rotary Club, and implemented by Mukhti Cox’s 
Bazar, a small local non-governmental organisation (NGO). They had driven their 
minivan onto the tarmac to meet two colleagues off the plane from a counterpart 
Rotary Club association in Sydney and were now posing for a celebratory picture. 
There followed a series of photographs in front of the banner, which I was also invited 
to join, perhaps intended as a way of adding to the international flavour of the 
proceedings, but I declined as I felt I might be getting in their way. But having been 
asked to become a part of what looked like some kind of performance, and viewed as 
having something I could bring to what was happening, I began to reflect what 
exactly was being performed and why. It appeared to me that I was witnessing a 
distinctively inclusive and spontaneous form of voluntary action, that was easily 
stretched across scales and appeared ready to accommodate a wide range of identities. 
 
In 2017 almost a million mainly Muslim Rohingya refugees fled sustained state-
sponsored violence in Burma to cross into the Cox’s Bazar area of south-eastern 
Bangladesh. Makeshift camps were soon set up and the crisis quickly began to receive 
international media attention.1 On the ground, there were reports of person to person 
support through which local people began responding, including spontaneous forms 
of informal helping, volunteering, distribution of packages of clothing and food, and 
collecting and giving money. While such early responses began as essentially local 
forms of action, they were soon joined by other help givers working at national and 
transnational scales of operation and over the space of a few months these evolved 
into a large-scale humanitarian response.  
 
This paper offers a reflection on what happened during those early stages of the 
response, and considers the ways in which humanitarian actions were performed by 
various actors as the crisis unfolded. It begins with an account of this early response 
period in the weeks that followed the increased numbers of Rohingya refugees 
arriving from Myanmar during late August 2017. Drawing on recent literature on the 
local and international dimensions of humanitarianism, this narrative is then unpacked 
in order to explore aspects of citizen aid including the changing nature of 
Bangladesh’s civil society, forms of religious solidarity and charity, and the 
importance of understanding these responses historically. The discussion draws on 
local and international press coverage, semi-structured interviews retrospectively 
conducted with local journalists and humanitarian personnel in March 2018, both in 
Dhaka and in Cox’s Bazar,2 and on the author’s longstanding engagement with issues 
of state and civil society in Bangladesh.  
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Recognition that humanitarian responses takes different forms and operates at 
different scales is important both in understanding local events, and in challenging 
dominant media and agency representations which tend to give certain forms of 
response higher visibility than others. Giving attention to forms of small-scale 
humanitarianism unsettles our more familiar and established narratives of 
international aid and development to reveal more of the depth, diversity and 
complexity of humanitarian action. As Redfield and Bornstein have suggested, the 
concept of humanitarianism is multifaceted: ‘a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral 
principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action’.3 Its 
diverse manifestations are sometimes expressed as the contrast between large-scale 
humanitarian action carried out by high profile non-governmental organisations with 
vast budgets and the less visible acts of helping or giving that are carried out by small 
groups or individuals seeking to express social concerns and identities. Erica 
Bornstein also reminds us that everyday forms of person to person helping are not 
only diverse but may also be ‘spontaneous, informal, unmediated, and habitual’.4 
 
This diversity is partly captured by the general term ‘everyday humanitarianism’, 
which has come to be used in various ways in the literature. Some have used it simply 
to recognise the diversity of humanitarian action within ‘myriad forms and practices’ 
from individual to organisational, corporate and state levels.5 Others have deployed it 
to contrast ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ forms of helping, or to contrast high profile formal 
humanitarian action with less visible, more spontaneous, smaller scale grassroots 
responses. Moving beyond these different ideas, and the limitations of 
formal/informal dualism, at a general level the term helps expand our understanding 
of the ‘aims, technologies, and participants’ of humanitarian action, and serves to 
highlight the sometimes overlooked experiences of local volunteers as they attempt to 
navigate different scales of helping and negotiate its associated tensions.6  
 
Within less visible worlds of informal voluntary action other terms such as ‘citizen 
aid’, ‘grassroots humanitarianism’, and ‘person to person helping’ are also used to 
convey the diversity of such activities. These reinforce the idea that such action needs 
to be understood on its own terms rather than according to outside categories, and the 
importance of contextual, structural and historical factors. Such terms are, as the 
editors of this issue have suggested, somewhat unstable categories that nevertheless 
offer a useful handle on the diverse forms of citizen helping and may illuminate the 
wide range of activities and motivations involved in humanitarian action across 
different settings and scales. As Hilhorst and Jansen have argued, humanitarian space 
can be understood as an ‘arena’ in which different actors seek to shape the nature and 
form of humanitarian action in terms of its ‘everyday realities’ through a range of 
different and frequently competing motivations.7 I argue here that concepts of local 
helping or everyday humanitarianism also need to be historicised in the Bangladesh 
case by contextualising them within peoples’ own experiences and memories of 
having themselves once been refugees. 
 
The lens of performance provides a further way of analysing humanitarian response in 
terms of diversity, process and change over time.8 For example, James Thompson’s 
analysis of case studies of Kosovo, Darfur and the Asian tsunami highlights how 
humanitarian performances may be understood as containing certain common 
characteristics – such as the communication of a narrative of suffering to different 
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audiences, the spotlighting of certain key events within these narratives, and the 
purposeful contrasting of heroes and victims.9 These tropes are also ones that feature 
in the Rohingya case. 
 
The focus in this article is on the early stages of the crisis during the second half of 
2017 and on the forms of spontaneous person to person helping with which the 
Rohingya refugees were greeted by many Bangladeshis. These small-scale acts tend 
to receive less attention than the work of formal agencies such as NGOs and inter-
governmental agencies, but they lie at the heart of voluntary action in most societies, 
and are far from new. At the same time, local citizen responses of this kind cannot be 
fully understood without reference to the Bangladesh state. The state played an 
important role not only in coordinating responses to the refugee crisis, but also in 
representing it, in particular through its effort to build representations of the crisis into 
wider political narratives of national generosity and religious piety. These narratives 
draw on local and national identities formed within Bangladesh’s own history of 
struggle and crisis, and lend support to the ruling Awami League’s (AL) ongoing 
efforts to demonstrate to its domestic and international audiences that it has earned the 
right to be seen as the ‘natural’ party of government. 
 
2. The 2017 Rohingya crisis and the responses 
 
Although the space is not available here to do full justice to the origins of the crisis, 
some brief background information is required to contextualise the case presented 
here. The Rohingya are a group of people, predominantly Muslim, who live mainly in 
Western Burma. Their language, ethnicity and religious identity is regarded by the 
Myanmar authorities as separate from mainstream Burmese cultural identity. As a 
result, they have experienced discrimination, persecution and religious oppression for 
many decades.10 The historical roots of the problem are complex, going back as far as 
when the British seized parts of Burma in 1824, from which time the territory of 
Burma was incorporated as part of British India, and beyond. Today’s international 
border between Bangladesh and Myanmar was simply a boundary between districts 
during the colonial period across which the British authorities regularly moved 
populations in line with labour requirements.11 Burma’s border with India was porous 
and the boundaries of the coastal region of Arakan (now part of today’s Rakhine 
State) – the area where most Rohingya live – were never formally demarcated when 
Burma was separated from British India in 1937. After Burmese independence was 
obtained in 1948 the large Muslim minority population living in Arakan was excluded 
from citizenship. A key element of the Myanmar state’s continuing refusal to grant 
citizenship is the assertion that the Rohingya did not form part of the state’s pre-1824 
population and that they therefore do not therefore qualify as a recognised minority 
group.12 
 
Conflict and instability have led to many waves of Rohingya refugees in recent times 
seeking refuge in Bangladesh, including in 1978, the early 1990s, 2007 and 2012. 
Such movements of people have been the result of Burmese government policies and 
longstanding tensions between Muslims and the majority Buddhist population in 
Rakhine state, where the Rohingya remain a significant minority, continue to be 
denied citizenship and are officially viewed as illegal migrants from Bangladesh.13 In 
2012, for example, more than 200 people were killed and 140,000 displaced when 
Buddhist extremists attacked Rohingya homes and businesses in Rakhine State in 
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retaliation that followed a reported assault on a local woman.14 The crisis that began 
on August 25 2017 was precipitated with an attack by Rohingya militants on police 
posts. What followed was a strategy of organised mass violence perpetrated by the 
Myanmar army and its local collaborators, including the murder of more than 6,700 
Rohingya in the month that followed, the systematic use of rape as a weapon, and the 
destruction of at least 288 Rohingya villages. 15 16 This violence prompted the large 
scale exodus of people across the border to Bangladesh. 
 
Through highly visible acts of individual and national generosity, first the 
Bangladeshi people, and then later the government, began to express their solidarity 
with the Rohingya refugees and initiated various forms of helping. Support started to 
be offered almost as soon as refugees began arriving in late August. On the 
Bangladesh side of the border people were immediately moved by the scale of the 
movement of people to give money, food, and shelter in a spontaneous outpouring of 
person to person helping and private giving.17 Some local businesses started 
organising meal deliveries, and provided clothes and housing materials to traumatised 
people struggling to cope. Individuals and groups from around the country also soon 
began arriving in the small town of Cox’s Bazar, some with hired trucks from which 
they started an ad hoc distribution of food and other relief goods.  
 
It was several weeks before the government began to take control of the situation. It 
was reported to me by one local aid official who was from a military family that the 
emotional responses of members of the local coast and border guards who were on 
duty at that time was an important factor in drawing attention to the severity of crisis 
and driving the response. Some of these guards were so distressed by the condition of 
the Rohingya people who were arriving, and by their stories of organised violence, 
killings and rape, that they began sharing their experiences with other colleagues and 
family the armed forces. Senior military figures reportedly told Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hasina that they needed the government to act in order to avoid a loss of morale and 
even discipline among their personnel. This began the process of establishing army 
control in which land was commandeered and cleared, camp facilities established, and 
governance structures put in place.  
 
Prime Minister Hasina responded by taking on a personal leadership role, although it 
is not known how far her stance was shared among all members of the cabinet. In a 
widely quoted declaration, she announced ‘If needed, we will eat a full meal once a 
day and share the rest with them.’18 The government agreed to provide food and 
shelter to the Rohingya, but also made it clear that the new settlements would be only 
temporary until the refugees - or forcibly displaced citizens of Myanmar, as they were 
being termed in 2018 - were in a position to return to their homes. Negotiations with 
the Myanmar government have been ongoing regarding the return of the refugees, but 
at the time of writing (mid 2019) there are few people who believe that this will 
happen given prevailing conditions in Rakhine state where Rohingya villages remain 
destroyed.19 
 
During the weeks that immediately followed the arrival of the refugees, there were 
charitable responses from a variety of individuals and groups. These were largely 
spontaneous and loosely organised, and reports of the generosity of local residents 
briefly became a global news story. Many of Bangladesh’s citizens were immediately 
volunteering and offering help to the Rohingya refugees, including people living in 
	   5 
the border region and those coming from other parts of the country. An element of 
this story was the fact that there was a widespread international perception of 
Bangladesh as a country more used to receiving aid than giving it20, crudely 
stereotyped as one of the world’s poorest and heavily overpopulated nations. 
 
On September 14th 2017, Al Jazeera’s Katie Arnold reported: ‘Moved by their 
suffering, citizens of Bangladesh have rallied together to deliver much-needed 
assistance to the new arrivals. Most distribute their goods from large trucks that now 
clog the rural road between Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf’.21 The article highlighted two 
contrasting modes of spontaneous person to person helping: the sharing of resources 
and space by those with very little, and the charitable distribution of largesse by the 
better-off, and these can be briefly contrasted. There are two briefly sketched portraits 
of individual ‘helpers’: one a self-described ‘poor farmer’ named Abu Hayed from a 
local village near Teknaf, who was providing shelter on his property to eight 
Rohingya refugee families; and the other a well-off Dhaka based middle class ‘digital 
entrepreneur’ named Mehedi Chowdhury, who was reported as having decided to give 
all his savings to support the refugees. Mr Hayed had given incoming families the use 
of an ‘old cowshed’ as a temporary shelter that offered space for the children to play, 
access to drinking water and was providing them with regular food. He explained his 
actions in terms of simple human support as a citizen expecting his government to 
take action: 
 
‘I gave them shelter because I am a human being - it is raining outside, they 
have nowhere to sleep, they are totally helpless. But I am a poor farmer, with a 
large family. I am trying to transfer them to a camp, but I am not getting any 
support,’ he says, passing a glass of water to one of his tenants. 
 
In contrast, Mr Chowdhury is presented in the report as a successful urban citizen, 
very much a part of Bangladesh’s new dynamic high-growth economy and its 
growing middle class. For him, the Rohingya crisis provides pause for thought and 
reflection, and appears to have led him to a moment of questioning and postponement 
of the materialist dream of this new Bangladesh to make a sacrifice. Rather than 
buying a new car as he was planning to do, the article explains, Chowdhury had 
decided instead to use the money to help the Rohingya refugees. He donated around 
US $9000 in order to buy tents and food parcels and became directly involved in 
distributing them, hiring trucks and handing out relief goods himself to crowds of 
refugees. He explains his actions partly in humanist terms, but reports that he is also 
influenced by a sense of religious solidarity: 
 
‘They are Muslim, and they are being persecuted because they are Muslim, 
that strikes a chord with me … and there is only so many times you can watch 
videos of someone being beaten or raped on Facebook - I had to come here 
and help,’ says the 29-year-old. 
 
This citizen helping effort is portrayed as hugely appreciated by the Rohingya 
refugees at the roadside, one of whom is quoted as saying 
 
If it wasn’t for the Bangladeshis I don’t know how we would survive. There is 
no space in the camps, and no international organisations have offered us 
support.   
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The first few weeks of the crisis had seen largely uncoordinated ‘person to person’ 
efforts to meet some of the Rohingya’s more immediate needs, but people soon 
started organising in groups and associations. For example, the national newspaper 
Prothom Alo as part of its community outreach work sponsors a network of 
community groups known as ‘bondhu sabha’ or friends clubs. These groups began 
arranging collections of winter clothes, sanitary towels, biscuits, and lunghis. Other 
small community level associations like Shopna Shiri (Ladder of Dreams) and 
Kelagor (Playroom) collected money and distributed relief materials. A number of 
small local NGOs who were already working in the area such as Coast Trust soon 
began to undertake fundraising and the distribution of relief goods. At the same time, 
voluntary action by students from the Cox’s Bazar Government College, who became 
involved in collecting food and relief goods for the refugees, provided another 
example of the diverse, multiple actors operating across private and public domains. 
Finally, private sector businesses also became involved, such as the Seagull Hotel 
where staff prepared and distributed hundreds of free meals each day for refugees, an 
example of charitable action from the for-profit commercial sector.  
 
Yet there was also a growing sense of unease in the Al Jazeera article, as the 
limitations of such small scale action were becoming apparent. First, certain limits of 
person to person helping became apparent, with the article noting that children could 
be seen to be fighting over scraps of food in the street. There is also a description of 
Mr Chowdhury’s efforts to throw food parcels from his vehicle outside one of the 
camps one evening that rapidly escalates out of control, creating a difficult situation in 
which his truck became surrounded by people engaged in a ‘tense and sometimes 
violent struggle’. When the supplies ran out, people climbed onto the truck to help 
themselves to whatever was left, leading Chowdhury reportedly surprised that people 
could fight over food, and reflecting on his own fear at the sight of such desperation: 
‘I thought we were going to die’. Brought into closer contact with a section of his own 
society in ways that he had not previously experienced, he seemed to have become 
discomforted. Although he is not explicitly critical of the mainstream relief agencies, 
Mr Chowdhury’s prioritisation of the need for immediate and personalised action is 
reminiscent of Hilhorst and Jansen’s (2010) category of the ‘non-governmental 
individual’ as a form of humanitarian actor whose numbers are growing and whose 
amateurism and informal helping can sometimes be the focus of criticism by aid 
professionals. 
 
At the same time as these local efforts were taking place, a more formal response by 
the Bangladesh government and the international community soon got underway. For 
example, the local government’s District Commissioner’s Office started taking in 
donations and distributing resources. As Richey and Chouliaraki suggest, tendencies 
towards formalization may arise within local humanitarian efforts and operations 
become routinized and practices rationalized over time.22 Once the initial month of 
mainly informal helping was over, the area around the town of Cox’s Bazar quickly 
became the location for one of the world’s largest formal humanitarian response 
efforts. 
 
This formal response brought together a range of international agencies – with a few 
local ones – that soon became coordinated by the Government of Bangladesh. The 
government had already in 2013 put in place a National Strategy on Myanmar 
	   7 
Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals. Under this strategy the government 
moved during late 2017 to establish a National Task Force, chaired by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, comprised of 22 Ministries and other bodies. This offered strategic 
oversight of the overall response to the needs of the undocumented Rohingya. The 
humanitarian agencies were coordinated by the Strategic Executive Group (SEG) 
located in Dhaka, co-chaired by the Resident Coordinator, the international 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The SEG helped the agencies coordinate with 
national level government engagement and liaise with the National Task Force. 
 
In broader historical perspective these administrative arrangements can be seen to 
rested on two longer term foundations: the history of efforts to manage earlier waves 
of Myanmar refugee arrivals to the area, and the government’s long experience of 
responding to Bangladesh’s own regular humanitarian emergencies created by its 
vulnerability to tropical cyclones and large scale flooding.23 For example, at District 
level, an existing Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), under the 
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, which was established during the early 
1990s to look after the 34,000 or so refugees who arrived at that time, had its mandate 
extended in 2017 to cover operational coordination for the newly increased refugee 
population. An administrative structure quickly took shape in which the District 
Commissioner (DC) took responsibility for coordinating operations among the 
Bangladeshi host communities affected by the crisis, and a Senior Coordinator (SC) 
was put in place to lead the response on behalf of the humanitarian agencies, liaising 
with the DC (and with other officials at the sub-District level) and with the RRRC. 
The SC chaired the Heads of Sub-Office (HoSO) Group that brought together the 
heads of all the UN Agencies and the representatives of the international NGO and 
national NGO communities, as well as two representatives from the donor community 
based in Cox’s Bazar. 
 
Alongside these government arrangements many international NGOs also formed a 
key part of the response, working in a variety of roles. For example, Save the Children 
Fund (SCF) had worked in the area since 1970, focusing on the needs and rights of 
children, particularly those unaccompanied and vulnerable to exploitation and 
trafficking. By early 2018 it had expanded its presence in Cox’s Bazar to 1,400 staff 
members and with a mix of local and international volunteers distributed tents, 
cooking and hygiene kits to refugees.24 Oxfam GB, also present in the area since the 
1970s, was active in monitoring responses to ensure that the water, sanitation, and 
hygiene facilities being constructed met international humanitarian standards, and 
provided clean drinking water, portable toilets and sanitation facilities, and plastic 
sheets for shelter. Médecins Sans Frontières, active since 1985, had deployed 2,000 
staff members providing treatment for dehydration, diarrheal diseases, and violence-
related injuries. Other international NGOs have more recent histories in the area. For 
example, Action Against Hunger, with a local presence since 2007, deployed around 
700 staff members and 1,000 volunteers in the delivery of hot meals and water, as 
well as providing treatment for malnourished children and mental health counselling 
for the large numbers of people affected stress and trauma. 
 
Despite the many international NGOs, the largest non-state presence on the ground in 
2018 was a Bangladeshi development organisation established in 1972 known as 
BRAC.25 One of Bangladesh’s leading civil society organisations, BRAC is active  
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throughout the country with its wide range of development programmes.26 Expanding 
its relatively small presence in Cox’s Bazar where it had been engaged in community 
level work it moved quickly to deploy 1,300 staff, and a further 800 Rohingya 
refugees were trained as volunteers to undertake health and education activities and 
measures for the protection of women and girls.27  
 
Also active for many years in the overall response efforts are various religious (or 
‘faith based’) international NGOs such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid. The former 
has worked with the Rohingya since 2008, when it constructed settlements for 10,000 
unregistered Rohingya refugees in the Teknaf area. The organisation provided food 
and shelter to the new arrivals, but along with Muslim Aid was reported as 
experiencing tension with the authorities after allegations were made that along with 
some other groups it had distributed materials sympathetic to the Jama’at-i-Islami (JI) 
political party, which is banned in Bangladesh. This controversy led in October 2017 
to restrictions being placed on this organisation’s activities, and those of some other 
religious groups’, in the camps.28 Alongside such organisations there were also less 
formalised types of transnational religious charity, including madrasa support, 
income generation skills training projects, and mosque based initiatives. Also present 
were diaspora organizations (such as the one encountered by the author in the 
introduction) operating, through which earlier waves of migrants and refugees may 
undertake support and advocacy activities with people who are displaced elsewhere in 
the world.29 
 
Both individualised citizen response and more formal interventions have continued to 
operate side by side, though by the end of 2017 the former had become overshadowed 
by the latter in terms of scale and resources. As the government, the army and the 
agencies took control of the situation, the humanitarian arena was transformed into a 
more tightly governed and ordered refugee space (see Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). 
Person to person forms of humanitarian action can be understood as a response to the 
absence or breakdown of order, and as helping to build a transition towards more 
stable arrangements. Tensions emerged not only within the different levels of the 
formal response (for example between international and local NGOs, religious and 
secular agendas, and government and non-state actors) but also with local responses. 
Informal logics of citizen helping were reported as occasionally coming into conflict 
with the differently organised world of professional aid and agencies. For example, 
Chris Lom from the IOM was quoted as being critical of the informal resource 
distribution methods used in some small scale citizen efforts and illustrated by the Mr 
Chowdhury example above: ‘The only way to do this is to walk through every camp, 
identify those in need, give them a token and invite them to an orderly distribution 
centre.’30  
 
3. Civil society, continuity and change 
 
Bangladesh’s civil society has received considerable attention as one of the 
contributing factors to the country’s achievements in reducing poverty and 
overcoming the imposition of military government during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The role of the student and language movements in the country’s struggle for 
independence has been well documented, as has the growth of the indigenous or 
national NGO sector that subsequently played a key role in the country’s progress 
with reducing social disadvantage, such as maternal mortality, and improving access 
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to education. By the 1990s it had become common for Bangladesh to be characterised 
as a vibrant civil society, based on these longstanding traditions of citizen action, 
resistance and social movements, and on its high profile set of large-scale 
development NGOs. These NGOs were not only providing education, health and 
credit services to poorer citizens but were also now engaging in forms of ‘small p’ 
politics through local community organising and national level advocacy.31 Analyses 
have tended to focus on the developmental and political dimensions of these non-state 
actors, but less attention has been paid to historical, cultural and performative aspects 
of the civil society sector, or to its local smaller scale manifestations. The case of the 
2017 Rohingya crisis provides a new perspective on these themes and offers insights 
into the ways that civil society is changing. 
 
Bangladesh has successfully pursued an export oriented growth strategy the past two 
decades. This has aided the expansion of a new middle class, part of which has 
become associated with a changing religious outlook.32 The forms of citizen helping 
that became visible during the Rohingya crisis can be understood as part of middle 
class distrust and even rejection of the formalised NGO sector, viewed by some 
people as over-professionalised and too corporate, or as tainted by political interest 
and corruption. NGOs have come to be seen as part of an increasingly partisan and 
compromised civil society. While NGOs were once associated with poverty reduction, 
social innovation and radical rights-based action, today’s version of civil society is 
less diverse and homogenised by the dominant emphasis on market-based approaches 
and service delivery. It is more constrained – in the sense of having been captured by 
party interests and patronage networks - leaving its organisations unable to play 
progressive roles in strengthening democratic citizen participation.33 
 
For a substantial element of this new middle class, the renewal of Islamic identities is 
providing alternative ways of imagining and performing charity and philanthropy and 
is contributing the shaping of a different kind of civil society.34 As Samia Huq points 
out, while Bangladesh’s founder Sheikh Mujib’s earlier nation building narrative had 
initially emphasised secularism, this initial period is increasingly remembered as one 
‘where the issue of religion, especially that of the majority population, was 
inadequately factored into discussions of national identity’.35 The 2017 refugee crisis 
and local responses offer one entry point for gaining insights into the ways that some 
social groups, and the government itself, are now seeking opportunities for a resettling 
of this discussion. Within this changing vision, religiously informed public action 
serves as a counterweight to the perceived corruption of secular public officials, 
political party activists and civil society leaders, while more personalised forms of 
direct helping offer an alternative to the image of the domestic and international 
poverty industry with its cosmopolitan professionals, air conditioned offices, donor 
money and expensive ‘logo-ed’ sports utility vehicles.  
 
The religious and personal dimensions of everyday forms of humanitarian action may 
be understood as part of efforts to modify or even purify what some citizens have 
come to regard as a tainted secular vision of civil society, and as a microcosm of the 
wider secular-religious shifts taking place in Bangladeshi society. The government 
seeks to maintain its legitimacy and its support base by tracking and reflecting these 
changing religious sensibilities, both by building coalitions with religious groups and 
by ensuring that it signals public recognition of religious sentiments. For example, in 
2018 the government moved to make the Qawmi Madrasa hadith qualification 
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equivalent to a master’s degree in Islamic Studies and Arabic. This strategy is also 
reflected in the government’s handling of its humanitarian response to the Rohingya 
crisis. It is not surprising then that religion has a powerful role in today’s landscape of 
compassion and voluntary action. The fact that the Rohingya are predominantly 
Muslim and have been so visibly the victims of religious persecution is important for 
understanding both local and international responses to the crisis. This resonates with 
Erica Bornstein’s concept of ‘lifestyle evangelism’ in which faith can be understood 
as a key motivator for humanitarian and development work and provides an important 
‘logic for its expression’.36 
 
Bangladesh secured its independence from Pakistan less than five decades ago, and 
there is a strong sense in which it remains a ‘state in the making’, in that both its 
system and its legitimacy remain under construction.37 The struggle to balance 
multiple and potentially contradictory strands of secular and religious identities 
continues, and remains as unfinished business. Definitions of national identity based 
on a majoritarian Muslim national identity have come to dominate over earlier 
versions of a multicultural Bengali identify that offered equal rights to religious and 
cultural minorities. Tensions continue, although the urge to understand national 
identities only through such binaries are also increasingly questioned.38 While secular 
Bangladeshi identities may be in retreat, the country nevertheless remains relatively 
free of religious extremism and alarmist predictions made during the 2000s that it 
might become ‘the next Afghanistan’ did not come to pass.39  
 
Public representations of citizen responses in the early weeks of the Rohingya crisis 
were striking in the ways they seemed to reference and chime with aspects of 
Bangladesh’s own history (Figure 1). The Bangladesh media’s coverage of the 
Rohingya refugees fleeing genocidal violence to arrive at the Bangladesh border 
revived powerful memories of earlier humanitarian action during the country’s own 
traumatic birth, when ten million Bengali refugees poured into India following the 
violent repression by the Pakistan army and its collaborators. The abuse of Rohingya 
rights, the violence perpetrated by vigilante groups orchestrated by a repressive 
militarised Burmese state, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, were all 
tropes that served to reawaken memories of this earlier period when Bengalis were 
themselves subject to severe state sponsored military violence.  
 
Conditions faced by the Rohingya were perceived in media accounts, and reinforced 
by people’s personal stories, to be analogous to those endured by Bangladeshis during 
the 1971 crisis. A Bangladeshi aid worker told me that in 1971 when (soon to 
become) Bangladeshis were fleeing the abuses of the Pakistan army in the Chittagong 
area, some had been protected by Rohingya people across the border in Burma, 
suggesting an element of reciprocity in the popular Bangladeshi response to the events 
of 2017. She also drew attention to ideas of selflessness within this contemporary 
humanitarian discourse to the Rohingya: ‘they are poor as we were, and as a citizen 
I’m proud to do this even if we have to sacrifice some of our standard of living’. I also 
encountered a more patronising view from some Bangladeshis that today’s Rohingya 
were poor, uneducated people, with large families, and with low levels of inoculation, 
making them easy to identify with since they were reminiscent of a Bangladeshi 
population from an earlier age, before it had become developmentally transformed. In 
this perspective Rohingya were therefore people deserving of both solidarity and 
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Figure 1: Visual continuities 
 
Cox’s Bazar, 2017    Salt Lake Camp, Calcutta, 1971 
 
        




An NGO worker and activist who had helped coordinate the international NGO 
refugee response effort in West Bengal during 1971, drew attention to parallels of 
representation between the two periods. There are striking similarities in the way 
photographs of refugees in the local media struck a chord with citizens and the 
juxtaposed image were being widely circulated in the Bangladesh press during the 
crisis.40 This historical framing resonates with James Thompson’s conceptualization 
of the performance dimension in humanitarian action in the sense that we can see that 
those who were once ‘victims’ are now portrayed as (at least having the potential to 
take on the role of) ‘heroes’41. Here also we can see how the working of humanitarian 
affect and of the power of reciprocity each serve to reinforce the authority of 
humanitarian action. It also reinforces the need to historicize understandings of local 
forms of helping and humanitarianism, and with the increasingly recognised need to 
engage with the power of representation in development more widely.42  
 
Returning to the idea of a changing NGO and civil society and sector, the crisis offers 
insights into the ways that Bangladesh may now be moving towards a ‘post-NGO’ 
civil society landscape. The main organisations that contributed to its reputation as 
leading the way in NGO-led ‘alternative’ development approaches during the 1980s 
and 1990s have either faded away, or morphed into other forms of hybrid private 
organisation.43 The large scale local development NGOs that are still operating tend to 
be focused on microcredit, business development and services rather than rights-based 
or social mobilisation work - and can these days be more accurately characterised as 
private ‘non-profit’ or ‘third sector’ service providers. BRAC, one of the last of the 
original large national NGOs that once dominated the country’s civil society sector, 
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now presents itself primarily as a ‘social business’, rather than as either an ‘NGO’ or a 
‘civil society organisation’.  
 
BRAC has itself been changed by the Rohingya crisis. Its roots were in relief and 
emergency work during the country’s early years, but during the 1980s the 
organisation had largely moved away from the emphasis on short term relief and 
reconstruction to concentrate on development work in support of long term change. 
For founder Sir Fazle H. Abed the opportunity to become involved in the Rohingya 
relief effort during the 2017 crisis was not only a humanitarian priority but was also a 
chance for organisational renewal by returning to its original mandate.44 In this way, 
the impulse of everyday humanitarianism does not necessarily bring a break with the 
past, but returns and feeds cyclically upon it. In BRAC’s case this reconnection with 
its earlier purpose has given it a sense of organisational rejuvenation as it has thrown 
itself into the Rohingya relief effort, mindful of its own origins in the humanitarian 
crises that followed the country’s devastating November 1970 cyclone and the 
aftermath of its bloody 1971 Liberation War. 
 
Religious narratives animate local and international helping, but they may also play 
into historical anxieties about the future and the past. For example, certain ‘faith-
based’ NGOs were as we have seen accused of serving unwelcome political interests 
during the early stage of the crisis period. This reinforces the idea that humanitarian 
action rarely serves to create pure moral or non-political spaces, and highlights its 
entanglement with politics. In October 2017, it was reported that the government’s 
NGO Affairs Bureau, which screens foreign organizations and controls the flow of 
international funds to local NGOs, had refused permission for three Islamic NGOs - 
Muslim Aid, Islamic Relief, and the Allama Fazlullah Foundation – to work in Cox’s 
Bazar with the refugees. The authorities investigated rumours that these organisations 
had been distributing JI materials and propaganda. The press reported that the 
government had explained that barring the organizations was ‘a preventative measure 
against potential radicalization in the camps’.45 As Didier Fassin (2012, p.224) has 
pointed out in the context of Western humanitarian efforts, here too in Bangladesh 
‘rather than becoming separate, humanitarianism and politics are tending to merge’. 
 
An uneasy accommodation exists in contemporary civil society between the AL 
government and various religious interest groups. As the AL government has sought 
to consolidate its dominant position in recent elections, it has worked hard to maintain 
support not only among its traditional secular support base but also to build new 
political coalitions, including with religious interests. For example, the largely middle 
class 2013 Shahbag street protests in Dhaka were a response to concerns that the AL 
government’s International Crimes Tribunal that had been set up in 2009 to 
retrospectively secure justice in relation to war crimes committed during 1971 by the 
Pakistan army and its collaborators was wavering in its administration of justice “long 
delayed”.46 In 2013 the had wobbled in its determination to follow through on the 
execution of those convicted of collaborating with the Pakistan authorities in the 
massacre of Bengali civilians.47 The protests were an assertation of secularism that 
quickly became portrayed as anti-religious by interests sympathetic to the JI leaders 
who were implicated in the trials. A backlash followed including a counter protest that 
was coordinated by the Hefazat-i-islami religious movement based in the country’s 
madrasas. Since that time the government has been careful to appease Hefazat, 
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including giving in to demands in 2017 that it remove a newly commissioned statue of 
a female symbolising justice from outside the country’s Supreme Court building.48  
 
Local humanitarian responses also need to be positioned within the global political 
economy of Islamic charity, from acts of small-scale private giving to the larger scale 
Saudi funding of mosques and madrasas. There have been concerns over cases of 
under the radar ‘low profile’ private giving from Middle Eastern sources through 
government channels, particularly in the minds of secular minded Bangladeshi 
journalists and civil society activists working in the area. One was keen to explain that 
he had recently observed a wealthy individual donor from the Middle East covertly 
visiting the local government office with the offer of a project for skills training that 
was also connected to funds for madrasa development, and that many such overtures 
were being received and in some cases accepted. 
 
The performance of piety was a visible feature of the local response. In a roadside 
area near Baluakhali Camp one local landowner spoke of his generosity in allowing a 
group of Rohingya families to erect shelters on his land, while at the same time 
gesturing towards the mosque he was now busy constructing based on his request for 
donations. Here is perhaps an example of what Margrit Talpalaru has termed 
‘conspicuous giving’49, in the form of highly visible acts, which in this context 
increasingly take religious shape as acts of piety. Disquiet has been voiced in the 
media about increased numbers of mosques that have been appearing since the crisis 
began, and the ways in which interest groups from outside – normally meaning the 
Gulf states – may use charity as a vehicle to for pursuing particular religious 
agendas.50 This resonates with Talpalaru’s ideas around visibility and representation: 
that certain types of charitable acts are performed in public space in order to attract 
public recognition.  
 
Charitable activity is sometimes understood as separate from market processes but 
this does not mean it is somehow unconnected from them. This particular landowner 
also explained that he was now charging rent from these refugee households as they 
went about setting up their small roadside businesses. He was now also beginning to 
profit from the situation and extend his reputation. Humanitarian action and local 
helping, and the acts of piety with which these may be associated, may be intimately 
connected with markets, sometimes creating new forms of mini market, or new 
opportunities within existing market processes. Opportunities arise for local business 
and entrepreneurial activity, with many relief goods such as solar lights and high-
energy biscuits highly visible in Cox’s Bazar as they were being resold by refugees to 
local traders in street side markets. This was reminiscent of the ‘fluid’ technologies 
that Scott-Smith (2018) observes working with, rather than against, the market in 
contemporary humanitarianism.51  
 
The performance of charity is not the exclusive preserve of donors, NGOs, civil 
society and organised citizens, but is also part of the work undertaken by government 
in its efforts to represent, build and sustain its legitimacy. The Bangladesh state can be 
seen not only in instrumental terms as coordinating the refugee response effort, but 
also as engaging in another type of performance: that of not only ensuring, but also of 
demonstrating, that it has everything under control among the camps and the refugee 
population. This performance is part of the ruling party’s enactment of its governance 
role, where it makes considerable effort not only to manage the crisis but also to 
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control representations of its response to the crisis, in order to build political capital 
locally, nationally, and internationally. The most obvious evidence of this are the 
banners and posters that dot the roadsides around the country. Many observers in the 
international community have rightly given the government credit for the ways it is 
handling the crisis, but this recognition sits uneasily with the fact that the AL’s own 




Figure 2: The visual politics of humanitarianism 
 





Little of this uncertainty has found its way into the story the government is attempting 
to tell. Large banners across the roads in Cox’s Bazar proclaim that ‘Hasina is the 
mother of humanity’ and the ‘champion for human rights’ (Figure 2), but there is 
disquiet among local people in Cox’s Bazar about the effects on the local economy, 
and increased indifference at the national level about the Rohingya. One concern is 
the numbers of unoccupied and potentially disaffected young people in the camps, 
whose direct experience of religious persecution may make them vulnerable to 
Islamist political groups who may be operating under the cover of humanitarian work. 
Another is that in the local economy of Cox’s Bazar the prices of essential goods have 
risen, while the cost of labour has fallen dramatically. A day of labouring on a fishing 
boat that once brought Tk600 for a day’s work can now be offered to a Rohingya 
worker for Tk200.53 Many Bangladeshis now worry that there is every chance that the 
country will simply be left to permanently absorb another million people. Meanwhile 
the government has reportedly signed up to a potentially dangerous plan to relocate 
some of the refugees to silt island of Bhasan Char in the Meghna river estuary, despite 
protestations from human rights groups.54 The diverse impulses of small scale 
humanitarianism that were observed during the early stages of the crisis have now 
dissipated, overtaken on the one hand by the formal mainstream international 
humanitarian machinery, and on the other co-opted by the state’s own continuing 
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The crisis that engulfed a small fishing town in the south east of Bangladesh from late 
August 2017 generated a varied and complex set of local, national and international 
humanitarian responses. Following Hilhorst and Jansen, we have analysed 
humanitarian space as an ‘arena’ in which a range of actors have shaped humanitarian 
action through different sets of motivations and everyday realities.55 In Cox’s Bazar 
almost immediately ordinary citizens were moved to offer individualised forms of 
person to person helping, and both informal and formal local organisations soon 
began improvising relief efforts. NGOs, national and international, some of whom 
were already working in the area, scaled up their work, attracting media coverage and 
new resources from the international aid system. Once this space was established, the 
government with the army took on an overall coordination role. We have argued 
further that the analytical lens of performance is useful to frame these forms of 
helping in relation to themes of history, identity and visibility. If we return to 
Thompson’s framework,56 we can identify from the case certain key characteristics of 
humanitarian performance in the form of events (the sudden large scale movement of 
700,000 refugees across the border), constructions of heroism (Hasina as the ‘mother 
of humanity’), and narratives of suffering (portrayals of historical continuities 
between 1971 and the present). 
 
Our focus on citizen helping during the early stages of the crisis also provides insights 
into two sets of interrelated changes within Bangladesh’s civil society. One was an 
observed gap between the efforts of ordinary citizens who wanted to provide 
immediate help through a ‘do it yourself’ approach, and the responses of the public 
authorities, the formal NGOs, and the international aid system. In part this followed 
from a time lag between informal individualised responses and formal organisational 
ones, but it also reflected the growing preference among citizens – in common with 
that observed elsewhere in the world – for more direct forms of helping alongside, or 
in place of, formal initiatives and organisations. Local responses to the Rohingya 
refugees illustrate how more flexible forms of small-scale civic action – as opposed to 
more formal, externally funded types delivered through professionalised organizations 
such as NGOs – are becoming increasingly visible within humanitarian and 
developmental action. The other was that these forms of citizen helping may also 
reflect growing tendencies among Bangladesh’s growing middle classes for more 
religiously-informed modes of helping within a civil society that is de-secularising. A 
heightened level of religiosity is part of a wider trend in Bangladeshi society in which 
the tradition of ‘secular rationality or religious neutrality’ has shifted in recent years 
to one in which ‘religiously informed voices are now part of the plurality of voices’.57  
 
Performances of humanitarian action therefore need to be understood against a 
changing and sometimes contradictory set of wider political and historical factors that 
impinge upon the ‘social script’ that informs charity and helping in Bangladesh 
society.58 These include the efforts of the Bangladesh government to build and 
balance alliances with both religious and secular interest groups, and more widely, the 
rise in transnational religious giving. Despite these trends, the forms of small-scale 
citizen action discussed here are not entirely new. They echo earlier patterns, 
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including those that occurred five decades earlier during the country’s 1971 War of 
Liberation. In this sense such activities do not offer a decisive break with the past but 
can also be understood as cyclical, connected perhaps to ‘afterlives of development’59 
that continue to echo within ‘the spirit of previous development regimes’. One cannot 
fully understand Bangladesh’s response to the Rohingya crisis without historical 
reference to the country’s own experience as a nation born in the aftermath of civil 
and ethnic conflict, following horrific violence perpetrated by a hostile military 
leading to the creation of a large scale refugee crisis.  
 
Structural processes have influenced forms of local helping, such as the changing 
ideologies and aspirations of the country’s rapidly expanding new middle classes, the 
shifting international geopolitics of religious charity, and the Bangladesh state’s own 
ongoing efforts to consolidate power within an increasingly authoritarian 
democracy.60 In those initial seconds on the tarmac at Cox’s Bazar airport in between 
receiving my spontaneous invitation to briefly become part of one such performance, 
and then deciding instead to go on my way, for a short moment it was as if I was 
present at one of the interfaces of these changing forces and felt its weight. 
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